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Tape 29  
Side A, 1/16 - 1 7/8

DRAFT  
Cy of draft to DDCI + DDA  
12 Sept 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR: All people coming to the Retreat on 30 Sept 78

FROM: D C I

1. In looking forward <sup>to</sup> ~~towards~~ our retreat on 30 September - 1 October, I would like to ask you to plan on three discussion periods of two hours each: 8:30 to 10:30 p.m. on the 30th, and 8:00 to 10:00 and 10:30 to 12:30 on the 1st. The three topics ~~for the retreat~~ I would like to discuss at these sessions are:

- a. The accomplishments of 1978 thus far.
- b. Goals for accomplishment in the next nine to twelve months.
- c. Personnel policies within the Agency.

2. Under the question of accomplishments I would like each of us to be prepared to discuss what he believes are the accomplishments in about the past nine months in his area. I would like to ~~be sure we keep in mind~~ focus on accomplishments that truly improve the quality of American intelligence. We are often kept very busy but what we are accomplishing is frequently just holding our own. For instance, we have to spend a lot of time explaining errors or supposed errors of the past. We also have to spend a fair amount of time preventing the ~~erosion~~ erosion of our positions and policies to various bureaucratic maneuvering. We also spend most of our time just carrying on the day-to-day requirements of producing the nation's intelligence. What I am really looking for, however, is our own estimate of what we believe we have accomplished that will improve our end product over time. In short, I would like to step back and make sure we are looking at the broader aspects

entities of the intelligence community will be forbidden to use at home or abroad the cover services of a wide variety of their fellow Americans — journalists, editors, members of cultural or humanitarian groups, churches, missionaries, scholars, students, Peace Corps members, and other categories.

Almost the only cover which the bill would permit clandestine agents abroad is that of the U.S. embassies. What this means is that clandestine agents will be reduced to duplicating embassy reporting — which is, of course, what happened in Iran.

Now what none of the so-called reforms effected in the past few years have addressed themselves to, and what the proposed legislation also ignores, is the very real need that has existed for the past decade to improve the analytical or estimating process of the agencies. The greatest weakness of U.S. intelligence has been its long-

time gross underestimation of the size, scope and purpose of the Soviet strategic buildup, and its consistently optimistic view of the Soviet Union's desire for a real detente. Significantly, the liberal and moralistic critics of our intelligence services have found little fault with the agencies on this score. The worst aspect of S2525 is that by making the entire intelligence community the virtual creature of six or eight congressional committees, the estimating process will become totally politicized, and lose all objectivity. National intelligence estimates will then no longer tell the president what he *ought* to know but what he and/or Congress want to hear.

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*This article is excerpted from a speech Clare Boothe Luce, playwright and novelist, politician and diplomat, gave recently to New York's University Club.*

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of our efforts and not being hypnotised by the necessary day-to-day accomplishments only.

3. Under goals for the next nine to twelve months I would like to revisit the goals and objectives that we tabled and discussed at our last retreat. I would appreciate it if you would each be prepared to discuss what you feel you have accomplished with respect to those goals and how you are going to move forward on them in the future. If since the last retreat you have found it desirable to revise those goals, let's discuss that also.

4. In the area of personnel policies I <sup>have</sup> ~~would like to ask~~ <sup>ed</sup> the DDCI to provide us a rundown on what we have accomplished and what we have in process by way of improving the management of our personnel. I would appreciate it if each of you would be prepared to discuss initiatives that you are taking in the personnel area which are separate from those being directed by myself and the DDCI. Improved personnel management remains my number one objective for the Agency. I am not satisfied with the rate of progress we are making and will be anxious for your views on how and where we can provide better and more equitable working conditions for our employees. They deserve it and we need them.

5. There will, incidentally, also be briefings and discussion periods for our wives during the 8:30 to 10:30 session on the 30th and the 10:30 to 12:30 meeting on the 1st.

S T

Nevertheless, this assault on the purposes and methods of the U.S. intelligence agencies and on the professional integrity of their leaders and loyalty of their personnel to our domestic ideals and institutions, has destroyed the public confidence that they had enjoyed for a quarter of a century.

The attack has left the intelligence community discredited not only at home but abroad. Hundreds of firings and hundreds more resignations have left it operationally weak. Reorganization by executive order has further weakened it. Today it is demoralized, torn by internal dissension over its policies and leadership.

Consider the fateful significance for American security in this astonishing admission made a few months ago by Admiral Stanfield Turner: Speaking before the National Press Club, he said:

"Allied intelligence services are losing confidence that we can keep a secret. We suspect that some are holding back information. One recently withdrew a proposal for a joint covert action which would have been beneficial to both nations. It did so when reminded that I must now notify eight committees of Congress of every covert action. They could not imagine that the plan would not leak."

A new omnibus bill for reorganizing and reforming the intelligence community and setting the boundaries of its work and authority is now in committee. It has been drafted under the watchful eyes of Mondale, Church and the Civil Liberties Union, lobbyists. Designated as S2525, its formal name is the National Intelligence and Reform Act, and it is 263 pages long.

The principal objective of S2525, as drafted, is to herd the entire intelligence community with its diverse talents and departmental interests into one vast bureaucratic corral responsible to a single super-director who will be responsible not only to the president but to eight committees of Congress. How many staff members will then be privy to intelligence affairs, who can say? Probably hundreds. If S2525 is enacted the CIA will be forbidden to undertake any clandestine action abroad, even with the full approval of the director, the National Security Council and the president until after "the facts" and circumstances of the activity have all been laid out before the large membership of the Senate and House Intelligence Committees. The director will also be required to report every six months to two Select Intelligence Committees on all clandestine activities being carried out by intelligence agents. All

Understandably enough, Soviet defectors of any significant importance have always been few and far between. The collection of enemy intelligence by human beings, or "humint," as it is somewhat awkwardly called in the spy business, has consequently had to rely heavily on foreign liaison and non-Soviet sources.

To overcome the impenetrability of the Soviet Union by "humint," in the past two decades the United States has developed highly sophisticated technical means. These include photographic reconnaissance systems and intercepts of foreign signals and communications. Today most of the intelligence input is produced by these technical means. But although this so-called electronic input is now enormous — indeed, almost overwhelming in volume — most of it is fuzzy, fragmentary and fragile. And two facts which critics of the agencies tend to ignore are, first — the quality of this vast quantity of technically collected information can be analyzed, evaluated and verified only by highly trained, and objective minds, in other words by "humint"; and secondly, no technical means exist today which are able to penetrate the minds of enemy leaders, or discern their secret plans.

More than three decades have passed since the enactment of the National Security Act. The pragmatic evidence is that the intelligence services have not — so far — failed to perform their essential mission. There has been no armed attack by the Soviet Union on the NATO countries. On the contrary, Europe has enjoyed the longest period of peace in the thousands of years of its history. There has not been, anywhere in the West, "another Pearl Harbor."

Nevertheless, since 1974, the intelligence services have suffered a sustained attack by the media and the Congress which has finally reached such destructive proportions that it can only be described as the "Intelligence Pearl Harbor." During the past four years, the CIA has been accused not only of innumerable abuses and illegalities; it is also alleged to have committed serious crimes.

It is now clear that 98 per cent of these accusations were false. For example: the Justice Department has not found grounds for a single criminal prosecution against any foreign intelligence officer. For the rest, the actual illegalities or abuses, i.e., those which violated the terms of the 1947 Act, were grossly exaggerated in numbers and moreover, had been terminated by the agency itself several years before the Church and Pike committees began to expose them.

The 1947 act recognized that an effective intelligence service must have two capabilities: first, the capability to collect knowledge of foreign secrets, especially those that might have a vital bearing on our own security; and second, the capability to analyze, verify, and evaluate all knowledge bearing on our security, and to turn it into estimates for the guidance of the president and his top foreign policy makers.

Now there are always a certain number of fools and nitwits in any society. But as we are a democracy, they, like every other group, are also represented in Congress. Fortunately, on the committees which framed the 1947 Act, there were no representatives who were not intelligent enough to give foreign intelligence necessary to the prevention of "another Pearl Harbor" could be openly, or legally, collected abroad. Congress well understood that it had to be collected by spies, and that, as espionage in all sovereign nations is considered a criminal act deserving of death, American citizens engaged in this dangerous business must be provided with "clandestinity", or cover.

The prime assignment implicitly given by the 1947 act to U.S. clandestine agents was to uncover the secret military and political designs of the Soviet Union. From the beginning this proved to be an almost Mission Impossible. The USSR was, and has remained, a hermetically sealed totalitarian society run by a handful of messianic, dogmatic, ruthless, and congenitally secretive dictators. Life for American undercover agents in the land run by the pseudo-tsars of the Politburo doesn't bear the slightest resemblance to the push, lush, sexy lives of the spies popularized in the James Bond-type novel. It is, in fact, pretty grim and decidedly unhealthy. It is even unhealthy for Soviet defectors-in-place. Big Brother is always watching. A Soviet citizen caught passing over even non-strategic information to a foreigner — say, statistics on the Ukrainian beet crop — if he is not shot as a traitor, winds up in the Gulag.

An oversight, or watch-dog, senate committee was subsequently designated with the power to monitor and review CIA's clandestine activities, and to keep a watchful eye to its observance of the terms of the charter.

In countries threatened with Communist take-overs or subversion, the Act was accordingly drawn to permit a wide range of clandestine activities and efforts. The National Security

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Tape 18

Side A, 3/4 - 1

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MEMO FOR:

11 SEP 1978

FROM: DCI

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I had a memorandum from  in response to a request I made to him for information about indications and warning, I believe. I'd like to get it back. Although I had it for a while, I never actually read it.

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*Per*  *action completed*  
*12 Sep 78*

Report by Mark Lane

Illustration by Peter Green

# THE ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY

## HOW THE CIA SET UP OSWALD

Three men were assigned major and public roles in the historic events of November 1963 in Dallas, Texas—John F. Kennedy, Lee Harvey Oswald and Jack Ruby. Since those tragic days the American news media have devoted a great deal of energy to a critical examination of Kennedy's personal and political life. Indeed, books and even front-page stories in major newspapers and television news programs have delved into the murdered President's tenuous ties, through an alleged sexual relationship, to organized crime. It remains one of the ironies of the past decade and a half that Jack Ruby is now emerging as a patriotic nightclub owner who loved the republic not wisely, but too well, while Lee Harvey Oswald has been reborn in the *Reader's Digest* as a skilled assassin trained by the KGB (Soviet secret police).

In February of this year CBS aired *Ruby and Oswald*, a drama which told us that Ruby was an emotional man, that he truly cared for the President and the President's wife and that he killed Oswald not because he loved him less but because he loved Jacqueline Kennedy more, and therefore quite naturally sought to spare her the additional grief of returning to a long and dreary trial. As the current media

revisionists tell it, Jack Kennedy was a lecher whose degrading sexual excesses betrayed a loving wife and a naive and trusting country. Ruby, on the other hand, suffered greatly through his pure and abiding love. In a sense, he both killed and died for us all.

And what of Lee Harvey Oswald? The forgotten, inept and hated loner of the early 1960s returns to us in the late 1970s as a cool, KGB-trained killing machine, courtesy of FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover's favorite transmission belt for the dissemination of false information, the *Reader's Digest*, and the questionable theories of an author who put his legitimizing credential as "critic of the Warren Commission Report" on the line for a budget of approximately \$2 million. No one dare call Edward Jay Epstein, author of the *Reader's Digest* book *Legend: The Secret World of Lee Harvey Oswald*, a cheap whore.

The lives and times of Jack Ruby and Lee Harvey Oswald were full and troubled. Neither was a loner. Both were deeply involved with American intelligence assignments, and Ruby had served as a front man for organized crime for a number of years. The details of their various assignments will

move us much nearer to understanding the implications of the assassination of President Kennedy. Before we look more closely at the *real* Jack Ruby, however, it may be instructive to look at the image of him now being promoted.

According to the television production, Ruby killed Oswald so that Kennedy's family—above all, the President's widow—would not have to suffer through a public trial. This media fabrication may now establish a trend. During May of this year David R. Berkowitz, the self-styled "Son of Sam" killer, pleaded guilty in New York City to having murdered six persons and wounded seven others during a year-long rampage with a .44 revolver. While entering his plea, he explained to the court (reportedly with a straight face) that he had decided to plead guilty "to spare the families of the victims the circus of a trial." Perhaps the TV "documentary drama" showing Ruby agonizing over Jacqueline Kennedy's forthcoming return to Dallas inspired Berkowitz.

Ruby, in fact, was a hired killer who worked for the FBI and organized crime. He murdered Oswald as an assignment. Shortly after Ruby's arrest—three cheers to the FBI—who were able to apprehend the hit man in their midst—

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Tape 18

Side A, 1/16 - 1/8

11 SEP 1978

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MEMO FOR:

FROM: DCI

*have*  
I <sup>have</sup> had a number of complaints that memos which I've written as a result of various meetings giving action or information to NFAC sometimes take a long time to get there--three or four days even. We recently had a specific example with the results of my meeting with Harold Brown on missile accuracy issues. <sup>I think it</sup> took about a week to get to Howie Stoertz. I'd appreciate your seeing what we can do to organize this system. It seems to me with the number of fine secretaries that we have we ought to be able to crank these things out in a matter of hours and get them on their way.

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THE WASHINGTON POST  
1 September 1978

ARTICLE APPEARED  
ON PAGE B-4

# View From the Top of the Military Ladder

## Book World

### SILENT MISSIONS.

By Vernon A. Walters

(Doubleday - 654 pp. \$12.95)

Reviewed by  
Norman J. Ornstein

The reviewer is associate professor of politics at The Catholic University of America.

Vernon Walters came to national attention as one of the panoply of witnesses to parade before the Ervin Committee and a national television audience to testify about his Watergate involvement. Walters, a U.S. Army general, had been appointed deputy director of the CIA by Richard Nixon, and was used by Nixon and Haldeman (though not so much as Haldeman wished) in their attempts to cover up the Mexican money-laundering connection to the Watergate burglars. Walters came across at the time as a rather dull but well-prepared witness, a bit player in that political drama.

So it comes as a pleasant surprise to find that "Silent Mission," the account of Walters' life, is a well-written and often fascinating book about a man who, through his own talents mixed with some coincidence, was involved in some of the most interesting and important events of our time.

Vernon A. "Dick" Walters is a classic military success story. He enlisted as a private in 1941 and rose through the ranks, finally retiring as a major general in July of 1976. In part, his success was rooted in a childhood spent largely in France, where he learned and became fluent in French, Italian, Spanish and German.

His facility for languages brought him to the attention of military authorities soon after he was sworn in, and he was encouraged to apply to Officers Candidate School—the first of many steps up the military ladder. He was ordered overseas, landing with

an assault on French Morocco, where he was used to interrogate French-speaking prisoners of war. Later during the war, he served as American attache to the Brazilian forces fighting on the Allied side in Italy (he quickly picked up Portuguese as a sixth language) and as an aide to Gen. Mark Clark. With his many Brazilian contacts, he was sent after the war to the American Embassy in Brazil as assistant military attache. He served as a translator there to Gen. George Marshall and President Truman at the 1947 Pan American conference, and for the next three decades, his discretion, intelligence and interpreting skills were in heavy demand by America's top political and military figures.

As a translator, Walters worked for Averell Harriman during the administration of the Marshall Plan in Europe; went with Harry Truman to confront Gen. Douglas MacArthur at Wake Island in 1950 and with Supreme Allied Commander Dwight Eisenhower to NATO in 1951; traveled to South America with Vice President Nixon in 1958 (he sat in the car next to Nixon during the famous rock-throwing incident in Venezuela), and

translated on various occasions for Presidents Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson and Nixon.

Over the years, he came to observe and know many of the key political figures of the 20th century, including de Gaulle, Tito, Franco, Mossadegh and Khrushchev, and he spent time in France, Italy, Brazil and Vietnam. He tells us a good deal about them all. In the most interesting part of his book, Walters describes in detail his role as secret intermediary, based in Paris, between the Chinese Communists and Henry Kissinger. He helped to arrange Nixon's stunning trip to China.

In a style that could only be called straightforward—short sentences, no flowery prose or strings of adjectives—Walters recounts events, describes people and gives his views. The book reads well, and Walters' droll sense of humor perfectly complements his writing style.

Walters is a man with strong political views with which many if not most readers may disagree. He remains a passionate proponent of the American involvement in Vietnam, and in many places in "Silent Missions" defends or excuses right-wing dictatorships while vehemently castigating communist ones. But no matter. Walters is an honest man with a fine eye for detail and a talent for telling a story. His book makes interesting and worthwhile reading to anyone interested in American politics and history.